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 Southern Gas Corridor managed by Azerbaijan and Turkey
Aleksandra Jarosiewicz
The Southern Gas Corridor is a European Commission initiative with the 
aim of facilitating the diversification of the routes and sources of gas im-
ported into Europe in the hope of reducing the EU’s dependence on Russia. 
Although the Southern Gas Corridor – alongside the EU’s flagship Nabucco 
project, which constitutes a part of the Corridor – was originally conceived 
as a means of furthering the interests of the West (officially the EU but in 
practice also the US), the implementation of the project has become possi-
ble almost exclusively thanks to measures taken by Azerbaijan and Turkey. 
Consequently, a project which the EU had hoped would protect its political 
interests has indirectly given Azerbaijan and Turkey considerable influence 
over the EU, since it is those two countries that have effectively begun to 
define the shape of the Southern Corridor. This became particularly clear 
when the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) agreement was signed on 
26 June 2012. If the EU wishes to ensure that the implementation of the 
Southern Gas Corridor project retains at least some of its original design, 
Brussels has little choice but to take into account the preferences of Azer-
baijan and Turkey at the expense of its own original plans.   
The Southern Gas Corridor – what is at stake?
Under the most ambitious scenario, the Southern Gas Corridor is to become the fourth major 
gas supply route into the EU, after the routes from Russia, Algeria and Norway – it would 
be an especially important route into Southern and Central Europe. The Southern Corridor is 
also seen as a way to gain access to additional gas supplies, which is particularly important 
bearing in mind the projected drop in gas production in Norway and the EU’s reluctance to 
increase its reliance on Russian gas, not to mention the EU’s objective of meeting its carbon 
emissions targets.
The Corridor was also an important element of EU policy on Turkey and potential gas sup-
pliers. Under the original plans, Turkey was to become an ‘energy bridge’, which would forge 
a long-term link between Ankara and the EU. The EU had initially hoped to secure an agre-
ement on unrestricted gas transit across Turkey (under the so-called Corridor Agreement), 
which would reduce Turkey’s role to that of a ‘transmission belt’; this idea, however, was 
subsequently rejected by Ankara.
In addition, the infrastructure built as part of the Southern Gas Corridor, or directly linked to 
the project, was meant to enable the import of gas from the Caspian Sea region (Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, and in the future also from Kazakhstan and Iran) as well as from the Middle 
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East (from Egypt via the Arab Gas Pipeline, and from Iraq through new pipelines). Stronger 
energy links with these countries were aimed at strengthening the EU’s position in the region 
and were to become one of the instruments used in the EU’s foreign policy. It therefore fol-
lows that the Southern Gas Corridor is important geopolitically not only for the EU but also 
for the US, due to Washington’s interests in the region. This was also the key reason why 
the US actively supported EU efforts to implement the project.
Since the project’s inception, the route and scope of the Corridor has been seen as posing 
a challenge to the interests of the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom in the EU energy market 
as well as to Russia’s political interests in 
the Caspian Sea region. Moscow has the-
refore been trying to block the implemen-
tation of the project by questioning its eco-
nomic and technical feasibility. One way 
it attempted to achieve this aim was thro-
ugh support for the construction of an al-
ternative pipeline – Blue Stream 2; curren-
tly it is backing the South Stream project, which aims to supply gas to the same markets 
as the Southern Gas Corridor. In 2009, Russia agreed to pay more for gas from Central Asia 
in order to lower the interest of these gas producers in seeking alternative routes into Europe. 
It has also been offering to purchase all of the gas produced by the Shah Deniz field, which 
for the time being is the only secure source of gas for the Southern Corridor. So far, however, 
Moscow’s efforts have not produced the desired results. The Southern Gas Corridor project 
will remain a key energy and geopolitical initiative for the European Union, and Azerbaijan 
continues to show interest in exporting its gas to the EU. What has changed, however, 
is the shape of the Corridor and the role of the individual actors involved in the implemen-
tation of the project.
The Evolution of positions on the Southern Gas Corridor 
Under the Southern Gas Corridor initiative, the EU has been most active in supporting 
the Nabucco project; this is seen as the most ambitious of the proposals (involving the 
construction of the largest gas pipeline, with a maximum annual capacity of 60 bcm) and 
the one which most fully delivers on the strategic aims defined by the European Union. 
The European Commission could perhaps be accused of having tried to put pressure on Turkey 
and Azerbaijan to opt for this project1 even though it was not in their national interests. Mean-
while, individual energy companies began proposing their own gas transit projects, especially 
the TAP and ITGI pipelines (for more information about alternative proposals see Appendix 2), 
which in turn weakened the bargaining power of the EU and gave Azerbaijan more choice. 
More recently, seeing that it could not impose its own terms on Baku and Ankara, the EU offe-
red to support any project capable of achieving the same objectives as the Nabucco pipeline, 
while the Nabucco consortium proposed a watered-down version of its original project, known 
as Nabucco West. Following the difficulties in implementing the Nabucco project in its original 
form, the most active member of the consortium, Germany’s RWE, announced in January 
of this year that it was considering withdrawing from the project altogether.
It should also be noted that over the last five years Baku’s position in negotiations with 
individual consortia interested in promoting their own projects, as well as the position of 
the EU itself, has significantly strengthened. Azerbaijan’s bargaining power increased fol-
lowing the failure of the EU to secure additional gas supplies for the Corridor (from Iraq 
and Turkmenistan), which left Azerbaijan as the only secure supplier for the whole project. 
In addition, Baku’s revenue from oil exports has increased significantly, resulting in a greater 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 This is best exemplified by 
the efforts of the European 
Commission to persuade 
Turkey to sign an intergovern-
mental Nabucco agreement 
in 2009. The agreement failed 
however to meet Turkey’s na-
tional interests, which signifi-
cantly contributed to the lack 
of support for the Nabucco 
project by Ankara.
Stronger energy links with these coun-
tries were aimed at strengthening 
the EU’s position in the region 
and were to become one of the instru-
ments used in the EU’s foreign policy.
i s s u e  8 6  |  1 8 . 0 7 . 2 0 1 2  |  c e N T R e  f O R  e A s T e R N  s T u d i e s
cOMMeNTARyOsw
3OSW.WAW.PL
confidence and assertiveness from the country. The projects supported by the EU under 
the Southern Gas Corridor initiative are effectively competing against each other – attemp-
ting to secure gas supplies for the Corridor from the same source, which allows Azerbaijan 
to play games with the individual consortia who attempt to put forward their own proposals. 
Moreover, Baku has begun to stress that it has other options than to transport its gas across 
Turkey and has started to propose its own solutions, such as transporting LNG to Romania 
(under the AGRI project), and has taken steps to diversify its gas export routes (under 
agreements to supply more gas to Iran and Russia). Baku’s position was also strengthened 
by the financial crisis which continues to affect the EU, while Azerbaijan is benefiting from 
increased oil export revenue, allowing it to reduce its dependence on foreign investment. 
A clear shift in the approach to the project could also be seen in Turkey; the government 
here were interested in increasing gas imports from Azerbaijan at a competitive price but re-
fused to assume only the role of a gas ‘transmission belt’ between Central Asia and Europe. 
It is also clear that Turkey wishes to play an important role in its relations with the EU and 
is not willing to give up its control over strategic projects carried out on Turkish territory. 
These ambitions, together with the failed 2008-2010 talks on the normalisation of Turkish- 
-Armenian relations, caused tensions in Ankara’s dialogue with Baku and delayed agre-
ements on the purchase and transit of gas. In addition, following a drop in Turkey’s interest 
in EU membership, Ankara has also become less interested in the EU’s flagship Nabucco 
project. And although Turkey has never officially withdrawn from the Southern Corridor pro-
ject, in practice it has abandoned its support for the pipeline. 
TANAP – how Azerbaijan and Turkey 
are building the Southern Gas Corridor 
A series of measures implemented by the European Commission, by energy companies, and 
above all by Baku and Ankara, have resulted over the last several  months in the adoption 
of a new approach to the Southern Gas Corridor. This became possible after Azerbaijan and 
Turkey successfully overcame a political impasse and reached agreements on the transit 
and the supply of Azerbaijani gas to Turkey (October 2011). This new level of cooperation 
was subsequently sealed on 26 June 2012 when the countries signed an agreement on the 
construction of the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP).
According to media reports, the agreement gives Turkish companies a 20% stake in the 
TANAP project (Botas 10% and TPAO 10%), while Azerbaijan’s SOCAR holds the remaining 
80 per cent. Later, however, Turkish officials suggested that Ankara would like to increase 
its stake in the project, and SOCAR repor-
ted that it was interested in retaining 50% 
of the shares and selling the rest to fore-
ign investors (BP was among the compa-
nies which expressed interest in investing 
in TANAP). The final division of the sha-
res and the terms and conditions for the 
pipeline’s operations are to be decided 
over the coming months. In the meantime, 
the companies are to carry out a feasibility study, which is to be completed by the end 
of the year, and are expected to make a decision about which of the European pipelines 
TANAP should be linked with.
The TANAP pipeline, with an annual capacity of between 16 and 60 bcm (depending on 
the version of the project) will run only across Turkish territory, thus ensuring the safe transit 
of Azerbaijani gas to the Bulgarian border2. In effect, by using the same strategic design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 The TANAP project was first 
unveiled in October 2011 
at a meeting scheduled to sign 
gas transit agreements be-
tween Azerbaijan and Turkey. 
3 In the first stage of the project, 
TANAP’s annual capacity has 
been estimated at 16 bcm; 
in stage two, the capacity will 
increase to about 31 bcm.
Using the same strategic design 
as that proposed for the Southern 
Gas Corridor Azerbaijan and Turkey 
have proposed a solution which gives 
them full control over the key section 
of the Southern Corridor.
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as that proposed for the Southern Gas Corridor (the same source of gas, the same route and 
the same markets as suggested by the EU) Azerbaijan and Turkey have proposed a solution 
which gives them full control over the key section of the Southern Corridor. Baku and Ankara 
will consequently have the power to decide how much gas reaches EU markets and when 
it is delivered; it should also be stressed that in the future the pipeline could carry not only 
Azerbaijani gas but also gas from the Caspian Sea area and Iraq3.
As a consequence, both states have found themselves in a significantly stronger position 
in their relations with the EU. Both Turkey – seen initially as little more than a building site 
and a weaker partner in relations with the EU – and Azerbaijan – treated simply as a supplier 
–are now becoming key players who will define the shape and the future of the Southern 
Corridor. The decision to go ahead with the TANAP project means that the pipeline will no 
longer be used by Europe as a bargaining tool in its policies towards Azerbaijan and Turkey, 
but will instead give more powers to Azerbaijan and Turkey in their relations with the EU. 
Nonetheless, the construction of the TANAP pipeline and the arrival of Azerbaijani gas in 
Europe will address the EU’s basic strategic interests, namely, the diversification of gas 
supply routes and suppliers.
Which market?
The appearance of the TANAP project on the agenda has also restricted the number of al-
ternative routes considered by local gas producers who are interested in exporting gas to the 
EU. The Shah Deniz consortium has decided it is no longer interested in pursuing the ITGI 
and the SEEP alternative routes (abandoned in February and June of this year, respectively). 
The only thing which still remains uncertain is whether the Azerbaijani gas carried across 
Turkey via the TANAP pipeline will reach Central Europe (Baumgarten) through Nabucco 
West or whether it will be transported to Southern Europe (the Western Balkans and Italy) 
along the Trans-Adriatic route (TAP). The final decision will be made by Azerbaijan and will 
be based not only on the price offered for the gas but also on Baku’s ability to purchase 
assets in the destination countries.
The Shah Deniz consortium (whose decisions are most strongly shaped by Baku) claims that 
by mid 2013 it will have decided whether its gas will be transported to Greece and Italy or to 
Central Europe. This means that over the coming months the competition between TAP and 
Nabucco West will become much fiercer4. 
It is also possible that the recently rejec-
ted proposal for the ITGI pipeline may re-
-enter the picture if Azerbaijan succeeds in 
purchasing assets in the Greek firm DEPA 
(this company is currently being privatised 
and it is one of the stakeholders in ITGI). 
Another important factor affecting the fi-
nal shape the Southern Corridor will be the 
measures taken by Russia, both in the EU 
and across the Caucasus. Azerbaijan, par-
ticularly due to the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (in which Russia plays a central 
role), is not willing to take any steps that could be seen as detrimental to Moscow’s strategic 
interests. This means that SOCAR may choose to avoid openly competing with Gazprom in 
the European energy market, possibly leading to a secret agreement between the compa-
nies on how the market could be divided. This, of course, would depend on whether Russia 
is interested in such an arrangement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 This can be seen in the two 
consortia’s attempts to attract 
additional investors already 
involved in gas production 
in Azerbaijan, including BP, 
Statoil and Total. 
Over the coming months the com-
petition between TAP and Nabucco 
West will become much fiercer. 
It is also possible that the recently 
rejected proposal for the ITGI 
pipeline may re-enter the picture 
if Azerbaijan succeeds in purchasing 
assets in the Greek firm DEPA.
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5 A Gazprom spokesperson 
has stated that Russia regrets 
Turkey’s decision to join 
the project, and suggested 
that in the future, when Iran 
suspends its gas supplies 
to Ankara (which occurs 
relatively frequently as a result 
of terrorist attacks), Turkey 
should turn to Azerbaijan 
for help, and not to Russia 
as previously. Due to Turkey’s 
limited gas storage capacity, 
the possibility of purchasing 
more gas from Russia (which 
meets around 60% of Turkey’s 
gas demand) is key for 
the country’s energy security.
Conclusions 
The creation of the Southern Gas Corridor on a smaller scale, but consequently also on 
a smaller budget (using the TANAP pipeline instead of Nabucco) is currently the most reali-
stic and probable solution. It therefore follows that the central role in shaping the Southern 
Corridor (including, the power to increase its capacity and use it to carry gas from other 
sources) will be played by Azerbaijan and Turkey, who have effectively ‘hijacked’ the EU 
idea. Consequently, the newly-built infrastructure will first and foremost serve Azerbaijani 
and Turkish interests in their future relations with the EU, rather than the other way round, 
as had been initially hoped for in Brussels.    
Nonetheless, the construction of the TANAP pipeline will help the EU to secure its key stra-
tegic objective, namely the diversification of gas sources and supply routes. In this respect 
the EU has been successful, even though it will not have the final say in the future shape and 
the use of the Southern Corridor. The EU does however still have a chance to use Ankara’s 
and Baku’s conflicting interests to its own advantage, and to exert some influence on how 
TANAP is operated.     
The signing of the TANAP agreement, which effectively meant the launch of the key sta-
ge in the implementation of the Southern Gas Corridor project, is detrimental to Russia’s 
economic and political interests5 in the Caucasus, Turkey and across the European Union. 
It is therefore expected that Moscow will do its best to stop, or at least impede, the im-
plementation of the Southern Corridor by, for example, speeding up its work on the South 
Stream project, in order to complete it before the launch of the Southern Corridor and 
to enter the lucrative EU markets first. Russia is also likely to use political pressure and 
‘gas blackmail’ against the states and companies involved in the construction of the So-
uthern Corridor. The most effective, although also the most risky, tool wielded by Moscow is 
the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The risk of further violence is increasing in line 
with the growing likelihood of a Western military intervention in Syria.    
AppeNd i x  1
Source of gas for the Southern Gas Corridor
Currently, the only secured source of gas already for the Southern Corridor is in Azerbaijan, where the government has 
made a commitment to use its gas from the Shah Deniz II field to feed the new pipeline. The amount of gas available 
from the field has been estimated at 16 bcm a year, with a launch planned for 2017. In addition, Azerbaijan is plan-
ning to start production at the Umid and Babek fields, which are currently being explored by SOCAR. Experts have 
suggested that production could begin within the next 5 years, although no concrete development plans have yet been 
proposed (and no information has been released about the estimated gas production volumes). Azerbaijan also has gas 
fields in the Absheron Peninsula, where development work is being carried out by Total. According to initial estimates, 
this area could produce up to 300 bcm of gas annually. Sourcing gas for the Southern Corridor from other potential 
sources continues to be impossible: Iraq, Egypt and Iran remain out of the picture due to instability across the Middle 
East. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan lacks the appropriate conditions to build the infrastructure required to export the 
gas across the Caspian Sea, particularly due to Russia’s objections, a lack of funding, and Ashgabat’s policies which 
keep investors away, as well as the Azerbaijani-Turkmen conflict over the Serdar/Kyapaz field, and Azerbaijan’s lack of 
interest in competing for the European market.
i s s u e  8 2  |  2 6 . 0 6 . 2 0 1 2  |  c e N T R e  f O R  e A s T e R N  s T u d i e s
cOMMeNTARyOsw
6
AppeNd i x  2
2. Most important projects for the extension of the TANAP pipeline into Europe
Nabucco West – faced with the lack of possibilities to implement the project in its original shape, the Nabucco consor-
tium decided to scale down the project and put forward an alternative proposal called Nabucco West. The proposed 
pipeline has been envisaged as an extension for the planned TANAP pipeline running across Turkey, and is to carry 
the gas from the Turkish-Bulgarian border to Baumgarten. Its estimated capacity is not, though, expected to exceed 
10 bcm a year. The proposal also shows that the Nabucco West pipeline would be built using the legal basis worked 
out for the original Nabucco project; consequently, the implementation of Nabucco West would not require any fur-
ther agreements. The consortium has reported that among the companies interested in investing in the project are: 
BP, Statoil and Total. The cost of the project has not yet been officially estimated.       
TAP – under the Trans Adriatic Pipeline project (estimated capacity of 10-20 bcm; stakeholders: Statoil – 42.5%, 
EGL – 42.5%, E.ON – 15%) the pipeline would be built from Greece, across Albania and the Adriatic Sea to Italy. 
The project also envisages the construction of storage facilities with a capacity of 8.5 bcm in Albania. The cost of the 
project has been estimated at 1.5-2 billion euros; TAP is the cheapest project proposed for the Southern Corridor. 
The TAP consortium has already signed memoranda of cooperation with companies involved in the construction of the 
Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline (designed to run from Albania along the coast to Croatia; with a capacity of 5 bcm). The IAP 
would allow the TAP pipeline to send its gas to a planned LNG terminal in Croatia. Following the decision of the Shah-
Deniz consortium (in February 2012) to abandon the IGI project as a potential route for the export of gas to Italy, TAP 
is the only project which could enable the export of gas from the planned TANAP pipeline to the Italian market. This is 
also the only project which could facilitate the export of gas to the energy markets in the West Balkans; although these 
are poorly developed, they are believed to have great potential for future growth. The gas supplied to the TAP pipeline 
would come from the TANAP pipeline through the Interconnect Turkey-Greece (ITG).       
SEEP – the South East European Pipeline was proposed in September 2011 by BP. Under this proposal, the newly 
constructed pipeline would start in Turkey and run across Bulgaria and Romania into Hungary (and possibly even to 
Baumgarten in Austria) – a route analogous to the route proposed for Nabucco West. BP claims that the project could 
be implemented by the members of the Shah Deniz consortium; in June 2012, however, the consortium rejected this 
proposal. The annual capacity of the pipeline has been estimated at 10 bcm. The cost of the project has not been 
disclosed.  
ITGI – consists of several projects: the existing Interconnector Greece-Turkey ITG (stakeholders: Botas and DEPA) 
with an annual capacity of 11.7 bcm; the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria IGB currently being constructed (sharehold-
ers: DEPA, EAD and Edison) with a maximum capacity of 5 bcm a year (the interconnector has received a European 
Commission grant worth 45 million euros) which is expected to be completed in early 2013; and a planned Intercon-
nector Greece-Italy (known as IGI or Poseidon) with an annual capacity of 10 bcm – the shareholders in this project 
are Edison and DEPA.
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